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Which Firms Do Prefer Islamic Debt?
An analysis and evidence from global sukuk and bonds issuing firms
Abstract
The Islamic debt instrument sukuk has been in the market for two decades; still, we do not
know why a firm prefers an Islamic debt over conventional debt, set aside religiosity issue.
We argue there is a genuine reason to choose Islamic debt because it has lighter indebtedness,
benefits of avoiding external monitoring, and tax incentives. Based on the cross-country data
for 346 firms issuing dollar-denominated global sukuk and bonds, we find that firms that
prefer Islamic debt and issue sukuk are financially more unstable, and thus exposing to higher
insolvency risk as compared to bond issuing firms.
Key Words: Islamic debt, Sukuk, Bond, Insolvency risk, Debt market barrier.
1. Introduction 
Sukuk, an Islamic debt alternative to the bond, has been in the global financial market for nearly two
decades since it was first launched in Malaysia. Sukuk originally advents in response to Muslim
investors’ demands for financial assets that comply with the tenets of Islam (henceforth Shari’ah) such
as interest forbiddance, asset backing of financial claims, and avoidance of investment in illicit sectors.
According to the international Islamic financial market report (IIFM, 2018), sukuk is globally available 
in 29 countries with an outstanding value of USD 434 billion as of 2017 and average growth rate of
25.4% since 2001. The sukuk market traditionally dominates in Muslim countries particularly in
Malaysia (55%), Saudi Arabia (14%), United Arab Emirates (7.9%), Indonesia (5.18%), Qatar (3.56%),
Bahrain (5.3%), Pakistan (1.6%), Turkey (2.52%), Oman (1.4%) and Kuwait (3.8%). The size of sukuk
market comprises about 28.5% of the total market debts (sukuk and bond) of these countries as of 2016 
(The Gulf News, January 18, 2017). However, demand is also growing in non-Muslim countries like 
United Kingdom, United States, Singapore, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, South Africa among others. This
is because global financial crisis pushes governments and corporations to diversify their funding
options, and sukuk has been emerged as an alternative to conventional bond because of the non-
speculative nature and ethical feature of the Islamic assets, according to CNBC report by Lee (2017). 
The phenomenal growth of sukuk issuance motivates us to study why companies issue sukuk instead
of a bond. This research issue arises because sukuk is neither a debt nor a corporate equity (Uddin, et
al., 2017; Securities Commission Malaysia, 2009, pp.21; Mohamed et al., 2015; Godlewski, 2010).
However, researchers usually consider it as a debt-like asset replicating bond equivalent cash flow but 
complying with Shari’ah principles of financial transactions (Trad and Bhuyan, 2015; Ahmed et al., 
2014; Alshamrani, 2014; Maurer, 2010). The existing literature is not adequate to know which firms
prefer sukuk in lieu of bond in their corporate capital structure. The earlier studies involving Islamic
borrowings by issuing sukuks focus mainly on the issues like information cost, market valuation of






              
       
          
         
    
            
             
        
     
          
      
        
       
       
     
     
      
         
        
      
         
          
     
     
       
          
       
 
    
      
     
    
          
         
        
        
target debt ratio of the firms (Nagano, 2017; Nagano, 2016; Nagano, 2010; Mohamed et al., 2015; Klein
& Weill, 2016; Grassa & Miniaoui, 2017). These studies mainly examine the determinants of sukuk
issuance. However, their findings do not answer a fundamental research question: which firms would
prefer sukuk instead of conventional bond to raise debt capitals from the financial markets - holding the
Islamic religiosity issue as ceteris paribus.
There is one study by Minhat & Dzolkarnaini (2017) suggesting based on an initial evidence that
Islamic financing does benefit less profitable firms since there is a ready demand from local Muslim
clientele who want to invest in Islamic assets due to religious motive. However, it does not answer the
question of why corporate firms offer foreign currency sukuks to global investors in the international
market where a ready demand for Islamic assets does not exist. It means some firms have genuine
reasons to choose sukuk instead of conventional bond because of differences in the underlying
contractual arrangement for these two debt securities. In this paper, we first make efforts to provide a
theoretical analysis to understand the reasons why a firm will prefer sukuk to bond when they need debt
capitals followed by an empirical study based on the cross-country data of the firms that have issued
dollar-denominated sukuks to global investors. This study is relevant for corporate financing decision
in the countries where firms have a choice between the Islamic and conventional borrowing, but prior
studies did not adequately address the question why some firms actively choose sukuk instead of a 
bond, particularly when they raise debts from the global markets. Also, it is not fully clear yet if the
firms offering sukuk have different characteristics than those of the bond issuing firms.   
The conceptual analysis shows that the issuing criteria for sukuk and bond might not vary
significantly, but sukuk could be attractive to the firms with weaker performance. This is because there
is no obligation for payment of fixed interest in partnership sukuks. Instead, the issuers share profit or
loss from sukuk-financed business with the holders of sukuk, means there is a scope for passing through 
the losses to the sukuk holders. Hence, the question of default may not arise. In the case of non-
partnership sukuk, issuers pay fixed coupons to the sukuk holder as lease rentals or credit purchase
installments. However, the legal recourse to rentals or installments defaults is not unconditional but
subject to the proofs of the sukuk issuer’s negligence, fraud, bad management, and wrong business
selection (Hassan, et al., 2013, pp. 268; Securities Commission Malaysia, 2009, pp.226; Lewis, 2008).
Hence, the default resolution process for non-partnership sukuk is more difficult than the bond defaults.
Therefore, we conjecture that mostly the weak performing companies that have lower credit strength 
would issue sukuks. In contrast, the firms having a good credit rating and better financial performance
is unlikely to issue sukuk because investors may be overpaid if there is a profit-sharing agreement
between the issuer and sukuk holders. This is likely because a firm with high credit rating should not
pay an extra risk premium. It is also unclear whether a financially sound firm would prefer a lease
finance or installment purchase by issuing non-partnership sukuks because it is important to estimate 






       
       
     
        
   
        
      
     
      
       
            
    
             
        
      
       
   
      
    
           
      
           
        
         
        
         
          
     
          
    
    
       
       
        
  
based on the theoretical analysis, we argue that the firms that are not able to perform well would find
the sukuk to be more convenient than the bond to raise debt capital - possibly because they have
difficulty to borrow from the conventional debt market due to the lower creditworthiness. 
We implement the empirical study using a sample of 346 listed firms from 10 countries over 15
years period 2002 to 2016. Of these, a total of 61 companies issue sukuk and 285 issue bonds. Overall,
the study finds that firms that use sukuk finance are valued lower and have weaker financial
performance than the bond using firms. This finding is significant after controlling for firm
characteristics, country variations, and time effects. We identify that weaker performance of the firms
using Islamic debts persists across different countries, industries, size groups as well as in crisis and
non-crisis periods. Also, the probability of using Islamic debt finance increases with the persistent
deterioration of the both financial and market performance of a firm. We also find that firms using
Islamic debt have higher insolvency risk in comparison to those using conventional debt. Therefore, it
is likely that the weaker firms issue sukuk as an alternative to conventional bond to circumvent the
barriers of the conventional debt market. However, the use of Islamic finance by issuing sukuk does not
help a weaker performing firm to improve its performance. 
This study has three main contributions to the body of literature in cross-disciplinary areas of
corporate finance and Islamic finance. First, this study documents that weak performing and financially
distressed firms issue sukuks to raise debt capitals and provide the empirical proofs from global data
based on dollar-denominated corporate sukuks. Second, this study shows that Islamic finance has a
broader application beyond the realm of religion as the sukuk market provides an alternative channel of
debt finance that is convenient for financially distressed firms. Third, we contribute a new dimension
to the studies on capital structure decisions involving debt and equity, because there is a new question 
of conventional debt or Islamic debt. On this point, our research suggests that financially distressed
firms can get easy access to the capital market finance by switching from conventional to Islamic debt.
However, these firms cannot improve their weak performance by using Islamic debt. Hence, our
findings and analysis are consistent with the corporate finance theory: financing decision per se does
not affect the operating performance, but inconsistent with Minhat & Dzolkarnaini (2017) who suggest
Islamic financing benefits less profitable firms. The key implication of this study is that sukuk holders
would need an additional risk premium because they practically invest in weak performing or
financially distressed companies on the top of Sharia’h risk in Islamic investment (Mollah & Zaman,
2015; Azmat et al., 2014). The findings also imply that sukuk has the potential to take a position in the
broader international markets despite its Islamic origin as it allows market access to distressed firms. 
We organize rest of the paper in following sections: Section 2 provides the literature review and
theoretical discussion on sukuk and bond. Section 3 describes test methods and data. Section 4 presents






    
      
            
         
    
   
      
     
   
    
            
        
     
     
       
              
        
       
          
     
        
        
       
 
            
      
             
     
     
       
              
        
        
      
     
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Analysis
We first provide a literature review on the research question of this study. Next, we conceptually
analyze how Islamic debt security (sukuk) differs from the conventional or pure debt instrument (bond)
with regard to indebtedness consequences, market regulations, and tax implications for the firms.
Finally, we develop the hypothesis of this study reflecting conceptual insights. 
2.1. Literature review
The findings of Nagano (2010, 2016, and 2017) provide the preliminary idea of why firms issue
sukuk. Firstly, firms issue sukuk instead of bank borrowing if they need a large amount of funds but
have higher information asymmetry in the conventional debt market, suggesting the firms would issue 
sukuk to overcome the information asymmetry in debt market. However, the question is: do all firms
have similar information asymmetry in the debt market? It is unlikely because the firms with lower
credit strength have difficulty in getting access to the debt market. In this context, the evidence shows
the credit rating has a negative correlation with the issuance of sukuk (Grassa & Miniaoui, 2017). 
Secondly, given the pecking order theory, Nagano (2017) finds that firms prefer sukuk instead of the 
bank loan or equity when the value of the firm is high. It puzzles us because Nagano (2017, pp. 151­
152) finds that debt issuance also increases with the increase of firm value. It means the issuance of
both sukuk and debt increases with the rise of firm value. Therefore, the underlying reason why a firm
prefers Islamic to conventional debt is not clear. Thirdly, based on the KZ index (Kaplan & Zingales,
1997), Nagano reports that sukuk issuing firms have lower financial constraints as compared to the
firms issuing debts. It also puzzles us because their finding implies: relatively distressed firms prefer
conventional debt to sukuk, and their credit ratings should be lower than those of the sukuk issuing
firms. However, the literature shows that sukuk issuing firms have lower credit ratings comparing to
bond issuing firms (Grassa & Miniaoui, 2017). Nevertheless, these studies do not help us to understand
the reason why a firm would prefer Islamic debt.
Another study by Minhat & Dzolkarnaini (2017) investigates to what extent the Islamic financing
instruments are used by non-financial firms using financial data from 14 developing countries that have
a non-negligible presence of Islamic banks. They find a negative relationship between the use of Islamic
financing instruments (IFI) and firm profitability measured by earnings before interest, tax,
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). Hence, authors suggest that IFIs are preferable to less
profitable firms as the local Muslim clientele has ready demand for Islamic assets due to the religious
motive. It perplexes us because corporate firms also issue foreign currency sukuks to the global markets
where investors are less likely to have a religious motivation to invest in Islamic assets - suggesting
other reasons for choosing sukuks by the issuers and investors. It is not clear if their study has used 
bank financing instruments or capital market instruments such as a corporate bond, stock, sukuk, etc.






            
      
            
   
        
      
       
      
       
         
      
        
     
            
          
        
      
  
         
   
            
 
     
     
           
           
           
           
              
       
      
         
  
     
        
     
16), one can assume the study considers borrowing from the banks. If so, the literature suggests bank
borrowing is theoretically different from the market borrowing by issuing financial instruments (Bolton
& Freixas, 2000; Fiore & Uhlig 2011). Also, the profitability proxy (EBITDA) of their study does not
reflect the effect of leverage and non-cash expenses, which is an essential matter in studying corporate
financing decisions. Therefore, we cannot get a clear idea of why firms choose sukuk instead of bonds.
In the study using Malaysian data, Mohamed et al. (2015) find that firms using sukuk can achieve
their target capital structure relatively faster than those using conventional bond. Authors attribute this 
finding to the sukuk issuers’ privilege to tap capitals from Islamic funds that cannot be invested in
Shari’ah non-compliant assets. This finding needs more careful analysis because we suspect there is a
religiosity clientele issue here. If a firm wants to raise debt capital from Malaysian market, then perhaps
sukuk is preferable due to the access of wider pool of investors (Muslims and non-Muslims). However,
when Malaysian firms raise funds from international market by issuing sukuk then the religiosity
clientele may not be a significant factor. Therefore, set aside the Muslim religiosity factor, why a firm
prefers sukuk to bond is still unknown. Mohamed et al. (2015) also find that firms with lower
profitability use conventional debt, which may be consistent with the pecking order and trade-off
theories of capital structure. However, the study also finds that firms issue sukuks regardless of the
profitability and internal funding availability, which means the pecking order and trade-off theories
seem to be not holding for sukuk issuance. Therefore, from this result, we are unable to find an answer
why debt issuing firms having lower profitability and inadequate internal funds are not switching to
sukuk market.
In another Malaysian study, Klein & Weill (2016) argue that firms issue sukuk because of the
information aysemmetry between the issuers and investors due to the moral hazard and adverse 
selections. In sukuk market, the moral hazard problem occurs because firms can pass the least
performing assets to the sukuk holders through Special Purpose Vehical (SPV), and adverse selection
arises because the riskier firms may take the advantage of information asymetry. Their empirical results
show that the likelihood of issuing sukuks is high when the firms have low earnings but high market
value. This intriguing finding is not constistent with the earlier study of Mohamed et al. (2015) who
find that Malaysian firms issue sukuks regardless of their profitability but firms with lower profitability
use conventional debt. The study of Klein & Weill (2016) is also not consistent with the later study by
Nagano (2017) who find that sukuk issuing firms in Malaysia and Indonesia have lower financial
constraints as compared to the firms issuing debts. Nonetheless, the findings of Klein & Weill (2016)
may indicate religiosity sentiment in Malaysian market because Muslims prefer Islamic debts, and
Shari’ah compaliants funds cannot invest in the conventional bonds. 
As a whole, the earlier researchers examine the determinants of sukuk issuance, but we still do not
know the main reason why a firm would use sukuk in place of bond when both funding options are






       
     
         
         
    
        
    
  
    
   
     
          
       
       
          
     
         
         
          
    
        
     
      
          
            
         
       
       
       
 
                
          
    
                
contractual mechanism of sukuk and bond are different; hence, the obligations and default consequences
of Islamic and pure debts are also different. In the financial markets where both sukuk and bond are
available, issuers might have an interest to issue sukuk as they can access the wider pool of capital from
both from Muslim and non-Muslim investors. However, when firms issue sukuks to global the investors
then the inherent characteristics of both sukuk and bonds are more important than mere religious matter. 
Hence, due to the paradigm shift in the debt contracts, we need to know the types of firms that may
prefer using sukuk in lieu of bond. Therefore, we provide a theoretical analysis on the contractual
differences, indebtedness consequences, regulatory and tax issues with regard to sukuk and bond.   
2.2. Theoretical Analysis
2.2.1. An overview of sukuk and bond
Sukuk is a structured financial instrument first introduced by Malaysian securities authority in 2002. 
This new asset is aimed at Islamization of the conventional debt assets, means the contracts of sukuks
produce bond-like cash flows for both the issuers and holders of the sukuks. We call it Islamization
because sukuk contracts must satisfy Islamic jurisprudence known as Shari’ah1 that prohibits fixed
interest on debt, requires asset backing of financial transactions, and restricts investments in businesses
involving alcohol, drugs, liquor business, pork, pornography, weapons, gambling, adult entertainments,
and those subject to ethical questions (Securities Commission Malaysia, 2016, pp.43; Mollah and
Zaman, 2015; ISRA, 2015, pp.177; Othman & Kamarudzaman, 2012; Afshar, 2013; Chong, & Liu,
2009; Ahmad & Hassan, 2007). The key difference between the conventional bond and sukuk lies in
the design of contracts between the investors and issuer of the financial asset. The bond contracts create 
a lender-borrower relationship between the investors and issuer whilst the sukuk contracts involve either
partnership or non-partnership business agreements. In partnership sukuk contracts (mudarabah or
musharakah) investors and issuer of the asset share profits and losses from the sukuk financed business;
whilst under the non-partnership contracts, there are two types of sukuks (ijarah and murabaha) that
create either lessor-lessee or buyer-seller relationship between the investors and issuer of the asset
(Uddin et al. 2017; Saad, Ibrahim, & Napiah, 2016; ISRA, 2015, pp.202; Al-sayyed, 2010). The bond
contracts could vary from the fixed to flexible interest payments and embed diverse types of contractual
features2 affecting the risk and return profile of the bond, but the legal relationship between the bond
holders and issuer as lender and borrower does not alter. Likewise, sukuks also vary widely in terms of
1 Shari’ah, the Islamic jurisdictions of complete code of life, derives from the Holy Book of Al Quran, the sayings of the
prophet Mohammed (Sunnah), the consensus among Muslim scholars (Ijma) and analogy (Qiyas) (Alshamrani, 2014; Wahab
et al., 2014; Ayub,2009, pp.41).






      
   
         
    
       
         
      
  
       
    
     
            
        
     
          
        
        
           
         
  
      
   
          
       
       
  
             
       
   
        
          
         
 
             
            
        
their underlying agreements3, yet such variations in contracts do not create a legally recognized lender-
borrower relationship between the sukuk holders and issuers. 
Overall, the holders of sukuks irrespective of their types are the owners of the assets purchased by 
the issuer firm by using the funds collected by sukuk issue. Also, the cash flows to sukuk holders are to
come from the incomes of sukuk underlying asset or business venture specified in sukuk indenture
(DIFCSG, 2017; Meager, 2017; Ahmed et al. 2015; Ahmad & Hassan, 2007). To the contrary, all types
of bonds constitute a lender-borrower relationship between the bondholder and issuer; and the issuer
holds the proprietorship and risk exposure of the assets purchased by bond issuance. Hence, we argue
that sukuk and bond irrespective of their types are characteristically different financial assets due to the
differences in the underlying contracts: bond is a pure debt, but sukuk is like a synthetic debt.
2.2.2. Indebtedness consequences 
We consider sukuk is a synthetic debt because the underlying contract does not formally recognize
issuer’s indebtedness to sukuk holders, but it practically creates financial obligations for the sukuk
issuer. Therefore, Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institution (AAOIFI, 
2010) and The Islamic Financial Service Board (IFSB, 2009) recommend sukuk to be reported as
liability in the corporate balance sheet. The key point here is that sukuk obligation is different from
bond obligation on the question of indebtedness, because the indebtedness resulting from the bond being
a pure debt has harsh consequence than that of the sukuk obligation. The creditworthiness and further
borrowing power are significantly lower for the indebted firms and they need to pay higher interest on
the borrowed funds. In case of the defaults in pure debts, the borrowers usually need to pay a penalty 
above the interest charge. However, there is no provision for default penalty system in Islamic finance,
instead Shari’ah recommends sukuk issuers (Islamic borrowers) to donate an amount to charity in lieu
of the penalty if payment default occurs (Bank Nagara Malaysia, 2016; ISRA, 2015; pp.264). However,
there is no clear guidance on the amount of such donation and its religious obligation. Since donation
is not an obligation under the common law, the legal consequence is unknown if the defaulting borrower
fails to give an amount to charity.
We also find another legal issue in determination of the sukuk holders’ claims if the company is
liquidated due to insolvency. This is because sukuk does not constitute a conventional lender-borrower
relationship between the sukuk issuing firm and investors, and there is no legal frame work to determine
sukuk holders’ claims over the assets of liquidating company. This question arises since, in partnership
sukuk contracts, the sukuk holders have shared-ownership with the firm on a particular business venture
or project, implying that sukuk holders cannot claim anything from the other projects or assets of the
3 For example, Ijarah (lease contract), murabaha (sales contract), mudarabah (partnership contract), musharakah (joint venture
contract), wakalah (agency contract), istisna (working capital management contract), salam (Islamic forward contract), and






            
        
        
           
       
        
      
     
     
         
          
 
   
         
   
           
      
         
      
        
     
        
        
       
     
          
     
        
           
      
         
     
     
 
           
          
       
liquidating firm (Onder, 2016; Ahmad et al. 2015; Safari et al. 2013; Afshar, 2013). In non-partnership
sukuks, the issuing firm either lease or hire-purchase assets from the sukuk holders for a limited span
of time (Saad, Ibrahim & Napiah, 2016; Ahmad and Rahim, 2013; Majid and Kamarudin, 2009; Lewis, 
2008). Therefore, sukuk holders remain as the owners of these assets while the firm goes into liquidation
before the expiration of sukuk contract. Hence, it transpires that sukuk holders have liquidation claims
over the specific assets reported in the company balance sheet - but not on the total assets. The next
question is whether the sukuk holders have priority claim on the specific assets of the liquidating
company as mentioned above, because sukuk obligations are not pure debt like bond. Although the
accounting regulations consider sukuk obligations as liability and recommend them to report in the
balance sheet, the bankruptcy and insolvency laws of the sukuk issuing countries do not address if the
sukuk holders’ claims get priority over that of the equity holders. In a nutshell, sukuk holders’
liquidation claims on the company assets is not yet well defined. 
2.2.3. Regulatory issues 
Let us now analyse the securities regulations that govern the issuance of bond and sukuk. This
analysis is important because the regulations may influence the corporate decision to raise funds by
issuing sukuk or bond. The review of securities regulations4 of different countries does not show
significant variations in the regulatory requirements such as issuer’s eligibility, credit rating, financial
disclosures, and other general requirements for the issuance of sukuk or bond. We find that any public 
company irrespective of its listing on the exchange can issue bond or sukuk. The issue of bond or sukuk
must be guaranteed by a bank or other relevant institution if the issuer is a non-listed firm. Although
the nature of sukuk contracts are different from bond contracts, both securities are issued for a fixed 
maturity. This means sukuk is redeemable like bond at the maturity. We also find that issuers arrange
independent credit rating before the issuance of both sukuk and bond. The rating agency mainly assesses
the risk of investments in these two assets, implying that investors can predict their risk of investments
in these two alternative assets. The sukuk issuer being a listed company is subject to same financial
disclosure rules applying to the bond issuers. Therefore, investors ideally have no informational
asymmetry if company issues sukuk or bond.  
The issuance of bond and sukuk though is subject to same security regulations, but their trustee
arrangements are not similar. In case of bond issuance, the issuing company hires an investment banker
as trustee to manage implementation of the bond indenture by protecting the interests of both issuers 
and bond holders. Thereby, the conflict of interest between the firm shareholders and debtholders can
be reduced (Bazzana, 2014). On the other hand, the sukuk issuing company creates a sperate legal entity
called Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) who issues sukuk certificates on behalf of the firm and oversees
4 We review relevant documents such as: Securities Commission Malaysia (2011), Moody’s Investors Service (2017), ICMA
(2016), National Bonds Corporation PJSC (2008), National Bank of Pakistan (2013), Mohammed (2014); Alshamrani (2014),






       
        
      
        
    
         
     
         
           
     
             
   
   
         
       
       
      
  
      
      
     
    
   
        
       
        
   
        
       
   
     
       
       
 
         
 
 
the implementation of sukuk indenture as trustee of the sukuk issue. Although, SPV has a separate legal
entity, it is often a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company originating sukuk issuance - means the
issuing firm is the de facto trustee of sukuk. Therefore, unlike bond issue, there is no practical third-
party trustee arrangement in sukuk issue. In the absence of a practical third-party trustee system, the
equity holders may expropriate wealth of the sukuk holders more easily and agency problem may
exacerbate. We suspect this because the trustee supposed to monitor the issuer on behalf of the bond
holders to make sure the issuer does not break obligations under the indenture (BondAdvisor, 2017). 
However, in sukuk, the issuing company being de facto trustee may prevent SPV from acting against
its parent firm in the event of indenture breach. On the other hand, in case of bond, the issuer has less
power to influence the third-party trustee to refrain from taking actions against indenture breach. This
is because an investment banker or trust company may lose market reputation and future business if due
diligence is absent in acting as trustee.  
2.2.4. Tax issues 
Let us review if there are tax implications for issuing sukuk or bond. We find that tax regulations
across countries generally do not differentiate between Islamic and conventional debts. The
corporations are subject to same taxation irrespective of the issuance of sukuks or bonds. Similarly,
investors also are subject to same income tax regulations without regard to incomes from sukuk profits
or bond interests. Although sukuk is not differentiated from bond for tax purposes, some countries like
Malaysia provides incentives5 for issuing sukuks. For example, Malaysian tax law allows deduction on
the expenditure related to sukuk issuance including those of SPV, exempts stamp duty on sukuk
documentations and property gain taxes while disposing off sukuk underlying assets. Malaysian tax law
also exempts tax on SPV income. In addition, tax on profits from ringgit dominated Islamic securities
is exempted for foreign investors. Following Malaysian practice, Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, Indonesia, 
and Turkey also embark on providing fiscal incentives to the issuers of sukuks. These incentives are
given to provide tax neutrality to sukuk issuance with respect to bond issue. This is because sukuk
contracts involve several underlying buying and selling of assets that involve asset transfer fees and
taxes that need to be compensated. We provide a summary of tax issues related to sukuk and bond
issuance in Appendix 1. As a whole, tax laws do not differentiate between Islamic and conventional
debts, but fiscal incentives are given for sukuks in some countries in order to create a level playing field
for both Islamic and conventional debts.
Finally, in the context of corporate financing theory, the use of Islamic debts (sukuk) per se being a
financing decision should not affect the operating performance of the firms in an ideal circumstance
since the corporate financing choice have no relevance for the corporate investment decisions. 







     
     
    
  
   
         
        
    
            
       
      
  
         
          
   
     
       
      
       
           
        
        
        
      
      
         
    
      
         
         
 
        
       
        
          
          
             
 
However, the underlying contractual structure of sukuks, as opposed to the conventional bonds, allows
the financially weaker corporate entities to get an easy access to debt market. Therefore, the weaker
firms will preferably choose sukuk instead of bond for their debt finance.
2.3. Hypothesis development
The analyses on contractual arrangements, regulations, and taxes with regard to sukuk and bond
presented above show that (i) indebtedness consequences of Islamic debts is not yet clear but is likely 
to be less harsh than that of conventional debts, (ii) the third-party trustee monitoring of the
implementation of sukuk indenture is absent, (iii) tax regulations generally do not differentiate Islamic
or conventional debts with regard to taxations but there is a growing tendency of providing fiscal
incentives to compensate for the additional costs of issuing sukuks. We argue that these issues could
have implications for corporate financing decision by issuing sukuk or bond being they are alternative
debt instruments. 
First, indebtedness is a concern of the firm with lower debt servicing ability due to the higher
likelihood of bankruptcy and liquidation. The firm has low debt servicing capacity if it has difficulty in
generating cash flow (Altman, 1968), due to the weaker earning capacity (Bognárová, 2016; Fernendaz, 
2006; Amuzu, 2010). Therefore, the poorly performing firms might prefer raising funds by issuing
sukuk instead of bond, because sukuk has less severe default consequences in comparison to bond
defaults. However, the lighter indebtedness consequence of sukuk is less critical for a strongly
performing firm due to its higher debt-servicing ability in contrast to that of a weaker firm. Moreover,
in the competitive debt market, a stronger firm may distinguish itself from the weaker firms by choosing
conventional bond instead of sukuk despite that both forms of debt financing are available. It is because
the issuance of sukuk by a well-performed firm may give a negative signal to the market as it should
not have issues with timely loan servicing. Evidence also shows that sukuk is a riskier asset than a bond
due to the different contractual mechanism (Alswaidan, 2017; Fathurahman and Fitriati, 2013; Abedifar
et al. 2013; Krasicka and Nowak, 2012; and Ahmad and Radzi, 2011), and Shari’ah risk6. Hence, sukuk
investors would need an additional risk premium for the higher risk profile of the asset (Sharpe, 1964;
Linter, 1965; Mossin, 1966; and Black, 1972). It implies that, by issuing sukuk, a well-performing firm
would unnecessarily pay a premium despite that it has less chance to default.
Second, in the absence of third-party monitoring, a sukuk issuer may find it comfortable to deal with
SPV – a whole-owned subsidiary. It is because a sukuk issuing firm being the de facto trustee for its
6 Islamic finance products must comply with Shari’ah guidelines about financial transactions. However, these
guidelines are not yet standardized globally because of different Islamic schools of thought that govern the practice 
of Islamic religion. Moreover, Shari’ah scholars revise guidelines due to changes in the real-life circumstances. 
Therefore, it is likely that an Islamic product could be permissible in one school of thought but not in other schools.
It also likely that an Islamic product is permissible today but may appear otherwise later. Details about the Shari’ah







           
       
           
          
       
          
   
     
        
      
     
     
      
  
     
           
       
          
      
     
    
          
        
       
           
      
  
     
    
 
     
    
        
        
          
sukuk can retain an indirect control over the escrow deposits and sinking funds as well as save the
external trustee fees. Besides, sukuk issuer may find it easy to work with wholly-owned SPV for the
disclosure of sensitive information because a subsidiary entity might be reluctant to disclose negative
news of the parent. Further, the SPV may not be very prompt if the sukuk issuer breaches any of the
covenants as their interests are not different from each other. In a nutshell, the sukuk issuer controls the
SPV even though they are separate entities technically. Thereby, a sukuk issuer can avoid indenture and
covenants monitoring by the third-party. Hence, we assume that a poorly performing firm might prefer
self-monitoring (via SPV) instead of external monitoring of the third-party trustee to overcome the 
stringent debt market regulations. However, indenture monitoring by an independent trustee is not an
issue for the well-performing firm because the probability of indenture breach is likely to be lower than
that of the poorly performing firm. Also, a stronger firm could find the self-monitoring of indenture is 
to be counterproductive because it would affect firm credibility in the competitive market. Hence, a
strongly performing firm may wish to distinguish itself from a weaker firm by choosing conventional
bond instead of sukuk.
Third, the fiscal incentives in many countries promote competitive markets for the sukuk issuers
because they can recover the additional costs of sukuk issuance from the fiscal incentives. However,
there is no arbitrage benefit as the incentives allow a firm to recover the extra costs of sukuk issuance
only. It generally implies that firms will not switch from conventional debt to Islamic debt for fiscal
incentives per se. Nevertheless, the poorly performing firms will get an edge when they consider issuing
sukuk for indebtedness consequence and avoidance of external monitoring.
Finally, set aside the religious motive to tap Muslim investment clienteles, the above analysis shows
that a weaker firm would find sukuk issuance is a convenient way to access to the debt market as it can
easily overcome the unpleasant consequence of payment defaults, retain the control over the indenture
implementation, and recover the additional costs of sukuk issuance. On the other hand, in the
competitive debt markets, a stronger firm can distinguish itself from a weaker firm by choosing
conventional bond instead of sukuk when both forms of debt financing are available. Therefore, we
construct the hypothesis as follows:
The firms with weaker performance are likely to prefer sukuks instead of conventional
bonds when both options of debt financing are available. 
3. Method and Data
We undertake the main empirical tests in two stages. The first stage tests examine the performance
of sukuk issuing firms as opposed to their bond issuing counterparts based on the system generalized 
method of moments (GMM) regression estimates determining the direction and the level of significance
of the partial correlation coefficient between the firm performance and firm identity as Islamic debt user






      
      
     
    
       
         
         
      
       
    
           
          
     
     
    
  
      
   
          
      
             
     
     
      
    
        
        
        
  
 
      
           
   
      
on the probabilistic models, which will validate the hypothesis of this study. Finally, we robust check
if the sukuk issuing companies being the weaker firms have higher insolvency risk than bond issuing
firms based on the system GMM.
3.1 Dependent variables
In the first stage, we examine two categories of firm performances, such as market value
performance and corporate financial performance. We measure market value performance by Tobin’s
Q and price-earnings ratio. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of the equity plus the book value
of debts divided by the book value of total assets whilst price-earnings ratio is calculated as the market
price per share divided by earnings per share. We use return on assets, return on equity and earnings
per share as the measures of corporate financial performance. The return on assets is calculated as the
net income divided by total assets, return on equity is calculated as the net income divided by total
equity and earnings per share is calculated by net earnings divided by the total outstanding shares. In
the second stage test, we estimate the probability of issuing sukuk so ்௩௦௙ (ௐ௬௢௬௢𝑖𝑡 = ଎ஜ௕𝑖𝑡) is the
dependent variable; in which, ௐ௬௢௬௢𝑖𝑡 = ଎ if the sample firm is sukuk issuer otherwise 0. 
3.2 Independent variables
3.2.1 Testing market and corporate financial performance
To examine the market and corporate performance of sukuk issuing firms in comparison to that of
the bond issuing firms, we specify a dummy independent variable sukuk = 1 if the study observation is
for a sukuk issuing firm, and otherwise 0. We also specify an array of sukuk dummies for empirically
testing the consistency of results across the sukuk issuing country, industry sector, firm size, and
financial crisis period. For example, Sukuk*Countryi = 1 if the observation belongs to the sukuk issuing
firm of the country i; we have 10 sukuk*country dummies in this test. Likewise, Sukuk*Industryi = 1 if
the observation belongs to the sukuk issuing firm of the industry i. We specify a total of 10
Sukuk*Industryi dummies. Sukuk*Sizei = 1 if the observation is from the size group i. We classify all
sukuk issuing firms into three size groups: large, medium, and small. The large sukuk firms are those
that with total assets above the 75th percentile of all sukuk issuing firms. The small sukuk firms are
those with total asset below the 25th percentile and the medium sukuk firms are those between the 25th 
and the 75th percentiles. Finally, Sukuk*Crisisi = 1 if the observation of sukuk issuing firm is for the
period global financial crisis period (2007-2009), otherwise 0. 
3.2.2 Testing probability of weaker firms to issue sukuk
We run a total of five instrumental variable probit (IVPROVIT) models to estimate the probability
of weaker firms issuing sukuk, using two measures of market-based performance and three measures
of corporate performance as defined above. Models 1 and 2 respectively uses Tobin’s Q, and price-






       
   
     
            
           
        
         
      
             
           
           
    
 
       
           
        
     
          
           
         
       
   
     
         
      
           
          
 
      
      
             
         
          
           
      
           
return on assets, return on equity and earnings per share as the corporate performance measures. Since
these variables are dependant variables in the previous tests, we assume reverse causality could be an
issue in these probit regressions due to endogeneity problem. Therefore, we use leverage (debt-to-equity 
ratio) as the instrumental variable in these five ivprobit regressions; so that models capture the
exogeneous effect of market and corporate performance measures on the probability of weaker firms
issuing sukuks. We consider leverage is an appropriate instrument in the context of our study because
average leverage of the sukuk issuing firms is not significantly different from that of the bond issuing
firm, and tests also find that leverage has no effect on the dependant variable [்௩௦௙ (ௐ௬௢௬௢𝑖𝑡 = ଎ஜ௕𝑖𝑡)] 
of Model 1 through 5. However, leverage has a significant effect on the performance variables: Tobin’s
Q, price-earnings ratio, return on assets, return on equity and earnings per share of the firms. The
univariate effect of leverage on these performance variables is high enough (F value ranges between
10.89 to 155.10) to use it as a good instrument in our probit regressions. 
3.2.3 Control variables
We identify several firm and country level control variables for this study based on literature. The
firm-level controls include market capitalization of firm (size), total debt to total equity (leverage), time
span between the incorporation of firm and the last day of sample period (age), net income to total asset
(return on asset), net income to total equity (return on equity), net income divided by total shares
outstanding (earnings per share), net cash flow divided by total share outstanding (cash flow per share),
total sales to total assets (asset turnover), net income to total revenue (profit margin), and total operating 
costs to total revenue (cost to revenue). The country-level controls include the natural log of the gross
domestic product per capita of issuing country (GDP_per cap), the annual rate of inflation of issuing
country (inflation), the corruption rate of issuing country (Corruption), the percentage of Muslim
population in the sample country (Muslim). Finally, by following Boubakri et. al. (2013), we add three
sets of dummies such as year, country, and industry to capture the unknown fixed effects. In which,
year and country dummies directly control for the time and country fixed effects while the industry
dummies capture the time-invariant fixed effect of the firms since the industry affiliation of firms
usually remains fixed. Let us now discuss the firm- and country-level control variables in testing the 
performance of firms and probability of weaker firms issuing sukuk.
In the regressions that examine market performance, we apply size, leverage, age, return on asset,
return on equity, earnings per share, and cash flow per share as firm-level controls. On the other hand,
we use size, leverage, age, asset turnover, profit margin, and cost to revenue as firm level controls in
the models examining the financial performance of firms. The effect of firm size on the market and
financial performance is well established in literature (Kim et al. 2016; Canback et al. 2006; Ramasamy
et al. 2005; and Banz 1981). The earlier studies find that leverage can adversely affect firm performance
(Vithessonthi and Tongurai, 2015; González, 2013; Ghosh, 2008; Opler and Titman, 1994), because






        
         
      
        
       
        
         
  
     
             
        
       
         
          
    
      
   
         
       
    
       
     
           
     
      
           
         
    
  
    
          
    
              
        
    
financial distress effect. Researchers find that age of the firm in same business negatively affect its
performance (Pervan et al., 2017; Loderer and Waelchli, 2010; Majumdar,1997), because of business
saturation and market competition. Since corporate financial results determine the value of firm, we use
the return on asset, return on equity, earnings per share, and cash flow per share as the firm-level
controls in the models testing for market performance. It is understandable that a firm has higher
turnover and more net income for every dollar of revenue if it manages the assets, costs, and earnings
more efficiently. Hence, we add asset turnover, profit margin, and cost to revenue as firm-level controls
for financial performance. 
In addition, we include GDP_per cap, inflation, Muslim, corruption as country-level control
variables in all test models across Model 1 through 5 of testing corporate performance. It is documented
that firm performance in emerging and developed countries varies due to business competitiveness 
environment (Goldszmidt et al., 2011; Seifert and Gonenc, 2018). Therefore, GDP_per cap captures
the effect of the level of economic development of country. Prior studies find that inflation affects
economic growth of a country (Chu et al., 2017; Eggoh and Khan, 2017) due to its effect on the
production costs and purchasing power. The concentration (%) of Muslim population determines the 
level of religiosity in the country that might affect the performance of firms due to the conflicts between 
the religiosity sentiments and effective corporate governance (Nakpodia et al., 2017). Therefore,
Muslim dummy captures religiosity effect on performance of firms. The prior studies find that
corruption negatively influences the sales growth and efficiency of firms (Kim et al., 2017; Ayaydın &
Hayaloglu, 2014), and thereby affect the corporate performance.
Next, in testing probability of weaker firms issuing sukuk, we apply size and age as firm-level
control variables. Evidence shows sukuks are usually issued to fund the large projects (Shahida and
Sapiyi, 2013); so, there is a likelihood that sukuk issuing firms are generally bigger than bond issuers.
We assume that sukuk issuing firms are relatively younger than the bond issuers. Sukuk provides the
opportunity of corporate fund raising for the indebted firms- which in more important for the younger
firms; because younger firms require more corporate capital for business expansion than that of matured
firms. We also add same country level control variables such as GDP_per cap, inflation, Muslim,
corruption as country-level control variables in all models 1 through 5 of testing probability of weaker
firms issuing sukuk.
3.4 Sample and data 
We search Thomson Reuters database to construct our study sample. First, we download the list of
outstanding dollar-denominated corporate sukuk as of 2017; then we identify the name of the issuing 
firm for each sukuk and the country of firm incorporation. We find a total 69 firms have issued dollar-
denominated corporate sukuks. These sukuk issuing firms belong to Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Malaysia,






       
           
     
          
    
     
     
   
     
     
  
   
            
         
      
        
   
      
         
         
     
        
        
 
          
    
         
      
 
        
            
       
       
      
       
        
denominated corporate bonds belonging to these 10 countries and then identify the names of bond
issuers. We identify that a total of 326 firms have issued dollar bonds. Therefore, the sample consists
of 395 firms belonging to above 10 countries and listed on the home-country exchanges; of these, 69
are sukuk issuers and 326 bond issuers. We extract market and corporate financial performance data of
these firms over 15 years from 2002 to 2016. However, we exclude eight sukuk issuing firms and 41
bond issuing firms because the essential test data are not available. Therefore, the study sample is
reduced to 346 firms where 61 are sukuk issuers and 285 are bond issuers. We believe the sample is
appropriate for this study because we intend to examine the research issue in a cross-country setting.
This is because selection of the firms issuing dollar-denominated global sukuks and bonds provide a
homogeneous group of samples belonging to different countries. 
[Insert Table 1 Here]
The details of sample distribution across different countries and industries are presented in Table 1.
Panel A of this table shows that a total of 37 (61%) global sukuk issuing firms out of 61 belong to three
countries such as Malaysia, Kuwait, and the UAE while remaining 24 sukuk issuers (39%) belong to
seven countries. Overall, Malaysia is the leading country with 15 firms issuing dollar-denominated
global sukuks followed by Kuwait and the UAE. Panel A also shows that, in comparison to sukuk 
issuers, the bond issuers are roughly evenly distributed among 10 countries, in which the maximum 52
(18.24%) global bond issuers belong to Malaysia while the minimum 19 (6.67%) belong to Bahrain.
Overall, among 10 countries, Malaysia stands at the forefront of issuing both sukuk and bonds in the
global debt market. The industry distribution of the sample firms presented in Panel B shows that 40
(65.57%) sukuk issuing firms belong to three industries such as banking, trade-service, and property. 
In which, banking is the leading sector that has 22 (36%) sukuk issuing firms, followed by trade-service
and property sectors that have 11 (18%) and 7 (11.4%) firms respectively. Panel B also shows that, in
comparison to sukuk issuers, the bond issuers are roughly evenly distributed among 10 industries,
except plantation and construction. The reason is that only 9 (3.16%) bond issuing firms belong to these
two industry sectors, in which particularly plantation has 7 (2.45%) bond issuing firms whilst
construction has the minimum 2 (0.71%) bond issuing firms. The remaining 276 (96.84%) bond issuing
firms belong to the rest eight industries, in which banking is the pioneer sector having 49 (17.2%) bond
issuing firms. 
The sample of sukuk issuing firms is overall relatively small considering the coverage of the
countries and industries, as 17.63% (61/346) of sample firms use sukuk while the majority (82.37%)
use bonds to raise debt capital from the international market. Therefore, we increase observations by
collecting data for 16 years. In this way, we gather a total of 4417 maximum clean observations
including 811 observations for the sukuk firms. To maintain the precision of results, we run tests on the
full data while taking sukuk firms as a dummy variable. However, the selection of firms issuing dollar-






      
     
        
          
       
       
        
           
       
            
             
        
           
          
          
          
   
 
                
    
         
       
           
            
             
          
        
                
   
 
      
       
          
            
   
religiosity motive of the issuers and investors. It is because, in the local market, sukuk issuers have an
investor clientele with religious feeling in favor of Islamic assets, but the global investors would instead 
consider the merits of sukuks in comparison to bonds. On the other hand, the bond issuers in local
markets might have difficulty to attract Muslim clientele due to their religious motive. Hence, firms
issuing sukuk or bond to the global investors are appropriate samples for this study.
Next, we process the test data after adjusting outliers and report descriptive statistics in Table 2.
From the dependent variable statistics, we find that Tobin’s Q varies from 0.0005 to 14.42 with an
average value of 0.75 for all firms but the average Tobin’s Q of sukuk issuing firms (0.504) is
significantly lower than that of the bond issuing firms (0.808). Price earnings ratio varies from 0.15 to
875.9 with an average of 23.39 for all firms while the average price earnings ratio of sukuk issuing
firm (22.98) is insignificantly lower than that of bond issuing firms (23.49). Return on asset differs
from negative 2.28 to 0.72 with an average of 0.043 for all firms but the average return on asset of
sukuk issuing firm (0.024) is significantly lower than that of bond issuing firms (0.047). Return on
equity fluctuates from negative 115 to 28.06 with an average of 0.08 for all firms but the average return
on equity of sukuk issuing firm (0.019) is lower than that of bond issuing firms (0.095). Earnings per
share varies from negative 54 to 35.16 with an average of 0.25 for all firms but the average earning per
share of sukuk issuing firm (0.203) is significantly lower than that of bond issuing firms (0.267).
[Insert Table 2 Here]
The statistics for firm level control variables show that the log of total asset (size) varies from 0.01 
to 5.53 with an average of 2.55. Leverage differs from negative 5.43 to 13.17 with an average of 0.79. 
Age ranges from 3 to 190 years with an average of 34.91. Free cash flow fluctuates from negative 53 to
26.8 with an average of .0043. Asset turnover varies from negative 0.23 to 88.17 with an average of
0.73. Profit margin ranges between negative 606 to 271.3 with an average of negative 0.024. Cost to
revenue varies from negative 153.4 to 501.4 with an average of 1.18. From the statistics for country-
level variables presented in Table 2, we find that the log of GDP_per cap ranges from 2.69 to 4.94 with
an average of 4.10. The inflation rate fluctuates from negative 4.86 percent to 44.9 percent with an
average of 4.72 percent. The corruption indices for sample countries vary from 0.45 to 9.76 with an
average of 3.51 out of 10. The Muslim population in these countries varies from 61 percent to 99 percent
with an average of 82.7 percent for all countries.
4. Results and Discussions
We execute empirical tests to examine if the firms with weaker performance are likely to issue
sukuks instead of conventional bonds and present results in this section. First, we present the findings
on comparative performance of both sukuk and bond issuing firms based on the system GMM estimates.
Next, we present the probit model findings on the probability of weaker firms to issue sukuk. Finally,






    
  
         
        
        
          
          
          
          
         
       
             
      
   
   
  
    
      
     
         
     
        
        
             
     
        
       
       
               
               
           
         
  
     
   
4.1. Comparative performance of sukuk and bond issuing firms
4.1.1. Univariate regressions 
The univariate GMM estimates reported in Table 3 below show that the coefficient of sukuk dummy
is negative for both the market and corporate financial performance measures. For the market
performance measures, the sukuk dummy is statistically significant at one percent level for Tobin’s Q
(Model-1) but it is not significant for the price earnings variable (Model-2). For corporate financial
performance measures, the sukuk dummy is significant at one percent level for return on asset (Model­
3) whilst that for the return on equity (Model-4) and earnings per share (Model-5) are insignificant.
The coefficient of sukuk dummy in Model-1 shows that the market valuation of the assets of sukuk
issuing firms (measured by Tobin’s Q) is about 39 percent lower than that of the bond issuing firms.
Similarly, the coefficient of sukuk dummy in Model-3 shows that the return on assets of sukuk issuing
firms is about 2.9 percent lower than that of bond issuing firms. These two results provide initial support
to our hypothesis that sukuk issuing firms are weaker than their bond issuing counterparts in terms of
both market valuation of assets and earning capacity.   
[Insert Table 3 Here]
4.1.2. Multiple regressions findings 
Next, we examine the performance of sukuk issuing firms as compared to that of the bond issuing 
firms after controlling the observable and unobservable firm and country characteristics as well the
year, country and industry effect. The findings in Table 4 show that the GMM coefficients of sukuk
dummy are significantly negative for all the measures of market and corporate financial performances 
as tested by models 1 through 5. Of these, the results of models 1 and 2 reveal that market valuation of
the sukuk issuing firms in terms of both Tobin’s Q and price earnings ratio is lower than that of the
bond issuing firms at less than one percent level of significance. Among the control variables, all are
statistically significant except age and cash flow per share. The results of Models 3 through 5 show that
the corporate financial performance of sukuk firms measured in terms of the return on asset and earning
per share is weaker than the bond firms at less than the one percent level. The financial performance of
sukuk firms measured based on the return on equity is also lower than that of the bond firms at the five
percent level. The control variables of these three models are also mostly significant, except inflation. 
However, age is significant only for Model 4. As a whole, all test models (1 through 5) are correctly
specified as all F values are significant at less than the one percent level. However, Model 1 that
examines firm valuation in terms of Tobin’s Q and Model 3 that examines corporate financial
performance in term of return on assets have more explanatory power than other models. All in all, the
multiple regression results in Table 4 confirm the univariate results in Table 3 that the sukuk issuing 









         
      
             
        
      
       
         
           
    
        
   
         
       
   
           
      
      
         
   
 
      
         
       
      
   
         
  
     
    
          
        
      
      
[Insert Table 4 Here]
Subsample analysis:
We undertake subsample analysis on different dimensions to check if results sustain similarly across
different countries, industrial sectors, size groups, and economic crisis periods. The coefficients of the
country-wise sukuk dummies presented in Panel-A of Table 5 show that the market valuation of the
sukuk issuing firms in terms of Tobin’s Q (Model-1) is lower than that of the bond issuing firms across 
10 countries, but the difference is insignificant for Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. The price
earnings results of Model-2 also show that the earnings of sukuk issuing firms are valued lower than
that of the bond issuing firms in six countries such as Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Turkey, Qatar and
Saudi Arabia though the valuation difference is insignificant in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. In consistent
with the market valuation results, the corporate financial performances of the sukuk firms are generally
weaker than the bond firms across all countries. We find that return on assets of sukuk firms are
significantly lower than that of bond firms in all countries except Bahrain and Qatar. Likewise earning
per share of sukuk firms are significantly lower in all countries except Qatar, Oman, and Egypt.
However, the return on equity of sukuk firms is significantly lower only in three countries such the
UAE, Pakistan, and Egypt. Therefore, based on the cross-country results of Models 1 through 5 in Panel
A of Table 5 we confirm that both the market valuation and corporate financial performance of the
sukuk issuing firms are significantly lower than the bond issuing firms. The market valuation results
indicate that sukuk firms across countries have lower growth potential and higher risk than bond firms
while corporate financial results imply that sukuk firms have less earning per dollar of asset than that
of the bond firms.  
[Insert Table 5 Here]
Next, Panel B of Table 5 presents us a comparison between the performance of sukuk and bond
issuing firms to check if the empirical findings sustain similarly across different industry areas. We
identify that the market valuation of the sukuk issuing firms in terms of Tobin’s Q (Model-1) is lower
than that of the bond issuing firms across 10 industry sectors, but the difference is insignificant for
trade-service, technology, mining and plantation. The price earnings results of Model-2 also show that
the earnings of sukuk issuing firms are valued lower than that of the bond issuing firms in five industries
such as construction, consumer product, finance, property, and plantation though the valuation 
difference is insignificant in construction, consumer product. In concomitant with the market valuation
findings, the corporate financial performances of the sukuk firms are also generally weaker than the
bond firms across all industries. We find that return on asset (Model-3) is lower than that of the bond
issuing firms across 10 industry sectors, but the difference is insignificant for mining, industrial product,
property and plantation. Likewise earning per share (Model 5) of sukuk firms are lower in all industries 






       
           
        
     
   
            
           
              
             
       
          
           
        
      
             
    
  
   
             
          
             
           
          
          
         
        
          
          
       
    
 
     
         
      
           
than bond firm only in the mining industry. For other industries the return on equity of sukuk firms are
also lower than bond firms but the difference is not significant. As a whole, the results in Panel B of
Table 5 show that the weaker performance of sukuk issuing firms in comparison to that of bond issuing
counterparts generally persists in all the industry sectors though levels of the statistical significance
vary.
Let us now check if the study results vary across different firm sizes such large, medium, and small.
Findings in Panel A of Table 6 show that market valuation of sukuk firms in terms of Tobin’s Q (Model­
1) is lower than that of the bond firms for all size groups, but the difference is statistically significant at
the one percent level for the large- and medium-sized firms only. The price-earnings results (Model­
2) show that only the large sukuk firms have lower market valuation in comparison to bond firms. In
consistent with the earlier findings, the corporate financial performance of the sukuk firms in three size
groups are significantly lower than bond firms regarding all measures such as return on asset, return
on equity and earnings per share. Overall, it appears that the sukuk firms irrespective of their sizes have
weaker financial performance in comparison with bond firms, but the market valuation is lower only 
for the large and medium sized sukuk firms. The small-sized sukuk firms do not perform badly with
regard to market valuation despite that they have weak financial results. 
[Insert Table 6 Here]
Finally, we test the performance of sukuk and bond issuing firms during normal and financial crisis
periods. This test is important because financial crisis systemically affect all firms, but we do not know
if the sukuk firms perform differently from the bond firms when economy falls in crisis. We find from
Panel B of Table 6 that Tobin’s Q ratio (Model-1) of sukuk firms during the crisis period is
insignificantly lower than that of the bond firms. However, the price-earnings results are different
because the earnings of sukuk firms (Model 2) are priced significantly lower than that of the bond firms.
The results of models 1 and 2 show that sukuk firms are valued significantly lower than bond firms in
terms of both Tobin’s Q and price-earnings ratios during normal periods. The results of Model 3 through
5 in Panel B show that sukuk firms have significantly weaker financial performance in the both crisis
and normal periods and these findings are consistent for return on asset, return on equity, and earning
per share. Therefore, we further confirm that sukuk issuing firms have weak corporate performance
and low growth potential. Nonetheless, the market valuation of sukuk firms is not significantly different
from the bond firms during the crisis period; this anomaly needs further study.
4.2. Probabilistic model results
Having confirmed that sukuk issuing firms have lower market valuations and weaker corporate
performance in comparison to bond issuing firm, we run ivprobit regressions to examine if the
deterioration of firm performance increases the probability of issuing Islamic debt instead to






        
        
          
   
           
       
   
     
       
        
            
       




   
        
        
         
     
      
         
         
       
   
        
      
   
          
          
    
         
        
       
which is statistically significant at the five percent level. This result implies that decrease in the market
valuation of firm leads to significant increase in the probability of firms choosing Islamic debt sukuk
instead of conventional debt, all else remain same. The probit coefficient for price-earnings ratio in
Model 2 is -0.030, which is statistically significant at the one percent level. This means the probability
of Islamic financing by issuing sukuk is higher when firm has lesser growth prospect and thereby the
price earnings ratio is lower. The probit coefficients for corporate financial performances such as return
on asset (Model-3), return on equity (Model-4) and earning per share (Model-5) are also significantly
negative. These findings suggest that firms incline more toward Islamic financing method when they
find it difficult to increase corporate earnings sufficiently. The negative probit coefficient for return on
asset further implies that, given the corporate payout policy, Islamic financing is safer when firm’s
internal growth rate (IGR) is low due to the lower earnings relative to other firms. Likewise, the negative
probit coefficient for return on equity also indicate firms may like to choose Islamic debt when their
sustainable growth rate (SGR) is low and cannot borrow additional conventional debt without further
increasing the risk of insolvency. 
[Insert Table 7 Here]
4.3. Robustness analysis
4.3.1 Insolvency risk and Islamic debt use
The above regression results confirm that firms issuing sukuks are weaker than bond issuing firms
in terms of market valuation and corporate financial performance. Additionally, the probit test results
identify that the likelihood of issuing sukuks increases when the market valuation of firms is low and
corporate performance is weak. These findings imply that the firms with consistently weaker corporate
performance may lead to higher insolvency risk. It is understandable that borrowings become difficult
for the firms with higher insolvency risk. In this circumstance, Islamic debts might be an alternative
borrowing option for these firms because of less severe default consequences as we have analyzed
before. We now empirically examine if the sukuk issuing firms have higher insolvency risk as compared
to bond issuing firms. In literature, Altman Z score uses several financial ratios such as liquidity,
leverage, profitability, and asset turnover to determine the bankruptcy likelihood of firms (Altman, 
1968). Altman z score measures insolvency risk for the firms but it is developed for manufacturing
firms only. Therefore, researchers modify the z-score to fit into the specific economic and business
circumstances (Altman, 1984; Altman, 2000; Altman, 2002; Altman et al., 2007; Wang & Li, 2007;
Chieng, 2013; Lepetit & Strobel, 2015; Sajjan, 2016; Lapteacru, 2016; Mohsni & Otchere, 2017). In
this study, we examine the insolvency risk of firms using Z-score that is measured as (௏ௌா + 
(ூ௨௬௠௫௰஛ா௪௪௜௫௪))஛அ௏ௌா. This Z-score compares the return on asset (ROA) and capital buffer (equity
to asset) of a firm with regard to the volatility of asset returns. The ROA based Z-score as defined above 






            
          
           
 
         
            
           
         
     
            
         
           
       
  
  
          
        
    
            
       
           
      
        
         
                 
         
     
         
          
     
  
   
      
     
     
measure of insolvency risk (Bouvatier et al., 2017). This is because the financial stability of a firm is
fundamentally linked to the uncertainty of corporate earnings as firm valuation drifts with an
unexpected drops in the earnings (Chudek et al., 2011), which reduces the distance to default for a
firm.
To estimate Z-score of a firm for the current year, we measure அ௏ௌா over a period of five years that
include the current year and four preceding years. In this way, we construct a panel of Z-scores for all
sample firms for 11 years from 2006 to 2016 and run regression to test if the average Z-score of the
sukuk issuing firms is significantly lower than that of the bond issuing firms. This robust test is
important to revalidate our study hypothesis because a lower Z-score implies higher insolvency risk of
the sukuk firms. However, following the literaure we use natural logarithm of Z-score in the robust
regressions because the simple Z-scores are not usually normally distributed (Houston et al. 2010;
Mohsni & Otchere, 2018). The prior study also finds that logarithm of Z-score is negatively proportional
to the log odds of insolvency (Lepetit & Strobel, 2015). The findings on the insolvency risk of sukuk
issuing firms based on the system GMM estimates are presented in Table 8.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
The all-sample findings in Panel A of Table 8 show that the coefficient of sukuk dummy in terms of
the logarithm of Z score is significantly negative for the sukuk issuing firms. It implies that the sukuk
issuing firms have higher insolvency risk in comparison to the bond issuing counterparts. In the Panels
B through E, we present subsample results on insolvency risk of the firms across different dimensions
such as (i) cross-country, (ii) cross-industry, (iii) size groups, and (iv) crisis periods. The coefficients
of the country-wise sukuk dummies presented in Panel-B show that the average Z score of the sukuk
issuing firms is lower than that of the bond issuing firms in all countries except Pakistan and Turkey. 
Panel C results show that the average Z score of the sukuk issuing firms is lower than that of the bond
issuing firms across all industries with a minor exception for trade-service sector. Panel D shows that
the average Z score of sukuk firms is lower than that of the bond firms for all size groups, but the
difference is insignificant for the large-sized firms. Finally, Panel E reports that the average Z score of
sukuk firms is significantly lower than that of the bond firms during both the crisis and non-crisis
periods. Overall, robust testing results reconfirm that the firms that prefer Islamic debts and issue sukuk
are financially more unstable and thus exposing to higher insolvency risk as compared to the bond
issuing firms. This finding is consistent across the countries, industries, firm sizes, and both good and
bad economic periods. 
4.3.2 Checking timing effect
In Table 7, we present probit results that suggest the likelihood of sukuk issuance would increase
due to the weaker performance of sukuk issuing firms. However, the empirical analysis requires to






         
     
            
           
           
          
  
 
        
        
    
 
         
      
           
           
           
       
          
   
 
      
     
     
         
         
       
       
            
      
            
    
    
      
probit models with the current and lagged performance variables (Tobin’s Q, price earnings ratio,
return on asset, return on equity, earnings per share) to confirm if the firms consistently perform poorly 
in the past years would issue sukuks instead of conventional bonds. We run two sets of robust probit
tests. The first set (TEST A) use lagged performance for the past three years (t-1 through t-3) in addition
to that of the current year. The second set (TEST B) uses the average performance of firms over the last
five years including that of the current year. The findings of robust probit models with lagged and
average past performance are presented in Table 9.
[Insert Table 9 here]
The findings of robust probit models re-confirm that the weaker performance in the past significantly
increases the probability of using Islamic debt instead of conventional borrowing from the financial
market. Table 9 clearly shows the coefficients of all lagged performance variables are consistently
negative and turn to become more statistically significant as time approaching the current year. Hence,
the robust empirical finding is consistent with our claim that firms tend to prefer issuing sukuk once
their performance becomes weaker over time. We also make efforts to understand if the poor
performance of firm changes later should they use Islamic debts instead of conventional debt assets.
We re-estimate the models of tables 3 and 4 by using lead performances (t+1 through t+3) as the
dependent variables instead of the current period performance (t). We find that the coefficient of Islamic
dummy remains mostly significantly negative for all the lead performance up to the lead year t+3. This
finding suggests the use of Islamic borrowing per se does not help improving firm performance as
operational efficiency could be the underlying factor.
4.4. Discussions 
In this paper, we shed lights on the use of Islamic debts in corporate capital structure by examining
the firms that issue sukuks instead of conventional bonds. This is a new academic issue that needs an 
intensive analysis and evidence. Sukuk as a fund-raising instrument first launched in Malaysia and
currently available in 29 countries in the world. This financial asset originally introduced to mitigate
the concerns of Muslim investors regarding the pure debts. However, when companies issue sukuks to
global financial market for raising corporate capitals, the underlying contractual arrangements of the
sukuks as opposed to bond contracts need an analysis on how the Islamic debts contracts differ from
the pure debt contracts to identify the circumstance when a corporate firm may prefer Islamic debt to
pure debt. Our analysis shows that indebtedness consequences of Islamic debts is relatively lighter than
that of pure debts, sukuk issuers can circumvent the third-party monitoring by an external trustee and
receive tax incentives to recover the additional costs for sukuk issuance. Given this analysis, we argue
that the firms that are financially unstable due to consistently weaker corporate performance and lower






        
   
  
     
      
       
   
          
    
   
      
     
         
      
         
        
             
       
        
     
   
           
        
         
      
        
     
               
  
         
     
       
     
       
    
       
financially unstable firms have limited access to pure debt market because of lower creditworthiness
and higher insolvency risk (Bolton and Freixas, 2000; Whited, 1992; Myers, 1977; Warner,1977).
Based on 10 cross-country data for 15 years, we find sukuk issuing firms have significantly weaker
corporate performance and lower market valuation in comparison to bond issuing companies. From
probit regressions, we also find that likelihood of choosing the Islamic debt increases when firms cannot
perform well in comparison to those issuing the pure debt. Therefore, the study identifies sukuk issuing
firms are exposing to higher insolvency risk in comparison to the bond issuing counterparts. The results 
are consistent across the countries, industries, firm sizes, and economic crisis periods. We observe an
anomaly in Pakistan and Turkey because the sukuk issuing firms in these two countries are not exposing 
to higher insolvency risk in comparison to the bond issuing firms. Similarly, the sukuk issuing firms 
listed under the trade and service sector are also not exposing to higher insolvency risk. The
inconsistency is also observed for the large-sized sukuk issuing firms because their insolvency risk is
not higher than that of the bond issuing companies.  
Therefore, the overall findings of this study imply that firms with lower creditworthiness can get
relatively convenient credit access through Islamic debt market because an access to pure debt market
might be more difficult for these firms due to higher insolvency risk. This means Islamic debt market
allows the weaker firms to circumvent the debt market barriers. Therefore, we may assume that, beyond
the realm of religion matters, the Islamic debt instrument sukuk can be spread out to the wider global
financial markets as a viable alternative to pure debts. On the question of Islamic or pure debts, this
study provides strong evidence that the financially weaker firms having higher insolvency risk prefer
Islamic debts to pure debts. Therefore, the credit rating of firms is negatively correlated with the 
issuance of sukuks (Grassa & Miniaoui, 2017). The findings of this study also have implications for the
investors. For example, the equity investors may require an additional premium to invest in the shares
of sukuk issuing companies due to higher earnings uncertainty. This implication of our finding is 
consistent with the evidence of common Islamic risk factor recently documented in Saudi Arabia
(Merdad et al. 2015). Similarly, the sukuk investors being the lenders also require higher return because
Islamic debt contracts are subject to risk-sharing by the sukuk investors (unlike bond investors). This is
documented by earlier studies (Bacha et al. 2015; Rahman et al. 2014; Ariff et al. 2013; Fathurahman
and Fitriati, 2013). 
We provide above analysis in the context of the global sukuk market where a local company issues
sukuk to the international investors. However, our results may also sustain in the context of a local
market where firms issue sukuk to the domestic investors. This is because debt market barrier to the
less-solvent firms is common across countries. The domestic sukuks are abundant in Malaysian market
only and Shahar et al. (2014) find that the Malaysian bumiputra companies prefer sukuk to bond. In 
these firms, the majority ownership belonging to the ethnic Muslim peoples, so authors suggest that






        
      
    
        
        
   
  
       
        
          
       
        
   
         
       
     
          
     
        
             
 
           
            
     
       
        
        
       
          
      
      
       
   
       
           
           
However, an earlier study by Marimuthu (2010) finds that these bumiputra companies perform poorly
in generating sufficient returns for their shareholders and maintain high financial leverage. Klein &
Weill, 2016 also find that less profitable firms issue sukuks in Malaysia. Therefore, these Malaysian
studies are not inconsistent with our cross-country findings. This means the financially unstable firms
prefer Islamic debt to pure debt is well evident. However, we need to take into consideration that Islamic
debt could be based on partnership and non-partnership contracts that might influence firms’ financing
choice and investors’ preferences with regard to sukuk types.
Finally, we distinguish our research with the earlier study by Minhat & Dzolkarnaini (2017), 
suggesting Islamic financing does benefit less profitable firms as they can borrow from local Muslim
financers who has a religious motive. Contrary to their study, we find that weaker performing and
financially distressed firms borrow from the global market by issuing sukuk instead of conventional
bonds - confirming that there could be different reasons (other than religious motives) such as lighter
indebtedness consequence, avoidance of effective third-party monitoring, and tax advantages that might
motivate the firms to use Islamic debts. We find that firms persistently perform poorly for several years
before issuing sukuk, and the weaker performance later does not improve as they use Islamic debt
instead of conventional debt, which is consistent with corporate finance theory that financing decision
per se does not affect the operating performance - instead, investment decisions matters. Also, our study 
suggests investors would require an additional risk premium as investors would invest in the weak
performing firms which is consistent with the earlier evidence that market reacts negatively to sukuk
issuance before and during the crisis period (Alam et al., 2013).
5. Conclusion
The Islamic debt instrument sukuk is a paradigm shift in the debt market because it mimics a
conventional bond equivalent cash flows for the issuers and investors, but it does not constitute a
traditional lender-borrower relationship. The invention of sukuk as an alternative to the conventional
debt emerges mainly from Muslim investors’ concern regarding conventional borrowing involving a
fixed interest. The dramatic growth of sukuk issuance in many countries of the world incites us to think
if there is a genuine reason (without regard to the religiosity issue) for a firm to choose the sukuk over
the conventional bond due to the innate features of sukuk instrument. Our analysis shows that the use
of sukuk has lesser indebtedness consequence in terms of default resolutions and penalties, advantage 
of avoiding external/third-party trustee monitoring of the debt indentures, and tax incentives to recover
additional issuing costs. Therefore, we hypothesize that the firms with weaker performance and lower
credit strength would prefer to use Islamic debt to conventional debt and approach sukuk market instead
of bond market. Using a cross-country sample of 346 firms issuing dollar-denominated sukuks and
bonds to the global investors, we find that firms that use sukuks instead of bonds to raise debt capitals
have lower performance in terms of both the market valuations and corporate financial results. We 






       
            
         
           
        
         
           
       
      
     
        





     
 
 
    
 
 
     
    
 
     
 
 
    
  
 
    
       
 
 
    
 
 
    
    
         
        
 
      
  
deterioration of firm performance and robust tests confirm that sukuk using firms have higher 
insolvency risk as compared to that of the bond using companies. These findings are consistent across
different dimensions such as cross-country, cross-industry, size groups, and crisis periods.
Therefore, we conclude that Islamic debt market provides an alternative channel of debt financing
for the firms with lower creditworthiness who might have difficulties to approach the conventional debt
market. Hence, an important implication of our finding is that sukuk market might support the firms
with higher insolvency risk to circumvent the debt market barriers by using Islamic debt instead of
conventional debts. Therefore, the sukuk as a fund-raising instrument has good potentials to occupy
space in the wider financial markets globally notwithstanding its religious origin. In addition, following
the view of risk-return trade-off, the investors might need an additional premium to invest in the firms
using Islamic debt capital rather than the conventional debt due to the higher risk. Overall, this study
enhances our knowledge on the role of Islamic system of debt financing within the realm of financial
market and corporate finance. 
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Table 1: Sample Distribution of Sukuk Issuing Firm (SIF) and Bond Issuing Firm (BIF)
Panel A: Country Distribution Panel B: Industry Distribution









































Total 61 285 Total 61 285










                 
   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
                 
                
                  
                  
                 
                
                
                
                  
                
                
                 
                 
                
                
                
                                      
                                     
                                  
                                   
                                  
                                
     
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Test Variables
Variable
1. All Firms (N=346) 2. Sukuk Issuing Firms (N=61) 3. Bond Issuing Firms (N=285) 4. Difference (2-3)
Obs. Mean Std. Min
Dev.
Max Mean Std. Min Max
Dev.




































































0.504 0.65 0.014 7.27
22.98 38.07 1.14 295.6
0.024 0.073 -.61 0.48
0.019 1.50 -40.95 8.43
0.203 0.468 -.89 2.89
2.70 0.812 0.01 4.81
0.808 0.476 -1.65 6.44
28.7 19.01 4 113
.084 0.43 3.66 4.31
0.26 0.31 -.06 2.26
1.16 16.1 -55.3 271.3
0.84 4.51 -23.5 74.9
0.808 1.14 0.0005 14.44
23.49 53.37 0.15 875.9
0.047 0.11 -2.28 0.71
0.0956 2.23 -115 28.06
0.267 1.40 -54.0 35.1
2.49 1.04 1.37 5.53
0.787 0.62 -5.43 13.1
36.24 22.48 3 190
-0.008 1.82 -53.0 26.8
.806 3.05 -.23 88.17
-.22 13.97 -606.9 205.1













Tobin’s Q ratio is calculated as the market value of the equity plus the book value of debts divided by the book value of total assets. Price earnings ratio is calculated as the market price per share divided
by earning per share. Return on asset is calculated as the net income divided by total assets. Return on equity is calculated as the net income divided by total equity. Earnings per share is calculated as net
earnings divided by total outstanding shares. Size is the market capitalization of the firm. Leverage is calculated as total debt divided by total equity. Age is the business firm existing years. Free cash
flow per share is calculated as the free cash flow divided by total outstanding shares. Asset turnover is calculated as sales divided total assets. Profit margin is calculated as net income divided by revenue.
Cost to revenue is calculated as total cost divided by total sales. GDP per capita is calculated as country’s gross domestic product divided by its total population. Inflation is the rate at which prices
increase over time. Corruption is the corruption rate of issuing countries. Muslim indicates the percentage of Muslim of a country. Asterisks ***, **, * denote the level of significance at respectively one,






      
            
      
      
          
          
    
 
     
     
  






















       
      
             
        
  
Table 3: Market valuation and corporate financial performance of sukuk issuing firms
Data: period 2002-2016, countries 10, industries 10, companies 346 (bond issuing 285 and sukuk issuing 61).
We test ்௜௩௝௦௩௤௘௥௚௜𝑖𝑡 = ୴ + ୵ௐ௬௢௬௢𝑖𝑡 + ୸𝑖𝑡 where market performance is determined by 
Tobin’s Q and Price earnings ratio, while corporate financial performance is estimated by Return on
asset, Return on equity and Earnings per share; Sukuk=1 if firm issues sukuk and ୸ is the error term.




































Wald chi-sq. 1415.7 19.15 326.07 10.98 49.54
Observation 3427 2698 3866 3540 3310
Asterisks ***, **, * denote the level of significance at respectively one, five and ten percent levels. The figures






    
     
  
           
            
               
               










   
 


















































   




   











   


























































       
      











       
        
              
              
             
      
Table 4: Findings on the market valuation and corporate financial performance of sukuk
issuing firms based on the system GMM estimators.
𝑛 𝑛 𝑛We examine ்௜௩௝௦௩௤௘௥௚௜𝑖𝑡 = ୴ + ୵ௐ௬௢௬௢𝑖𝑡 + ୞ ୮ீ௦௥௫௩௦௣௪𝑖𝑡 + ୞ + ୞ ୻𝑖ீ௦௬௥௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑛 
𝑖௛ௐ 𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖௖௜௘௩𝑖𝑡 𝑖௛ௐ 
୞ ୻𝑖ெ௥௛௬௪௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 where market performance is determined by Tobin’s Q and Price earnings ratio, while𝑖௛ௐ + ୸𝑖𝑡 
corporate financial performance is estimated by Return on asset, Return on equity and Earnings per share; Sukuk=1
if firm issues sukuk, controls includes a set of firm level and country level control variables, and finally ௖௜௘௩𝑖𝑡 , 
ீ௦௬௥௫௩௰𝑖𝑡୼ and ெ௥௛௬௪௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 are respectively year, country and industry dummies in the model. We estimate the












































































































































Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes











Wald chi-sq. 365.87 143.25 313.80 319.28 749.70





Asterisks ***, **, * denote the level of significance respectively at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. The values in the
parenthesis show robust t value. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are below the level of tolerance (VIF=5). In model 1 and
model 2 of market value measures, we do not control asset turnover, profit margin, and cost to revenue due to the










    
     
         
 
 
      
   













































































































































































































































                     
                 
          
Table: 5 Findings on the performance of sukuk issuing firms across different countries and industries based on the system GMM
estimators. 
Panel A:  Country variation analysis
𝑛 𝑛்௜௩௝௦௩௤௘௥௚௜𝑖𝑡 = ୴ + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୵௠ ௐ௬௢௬௢௏௚௦௬௥௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୮ீ௦௥௫௩௦௣𝑖𝑡 + 
௥ ௥ ௥୞ ୻௠௖௜௘௩௠௫ + ୞ ୻௠ெ௥௛௬௪௫௩௰ + ୞ ୻௠ீ௦௬௥௫௩௰ + ୸𝑖𝑡 , where ௠=଎ ௠=଎ ௠௫ ௠=଎ ௠௫ 
𝑛୞𝑖௛ௐ ୵௠ ௐ௬௢௬௢௏௚௦௬௥௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 are different subsample dummies. Example, Sukuk_Bahrain
= 1 if the observation is a Bahrain sukuk issuing firm.
Panel B:  Industry variation analysis
𝑛 𝑛்௜௩௝௦௩௤௘௥௚௜𝑖𝑡 = ୴ + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୵௠ ௐ௬௢௬௢௏௠௥௛௬௪௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୮ீ௦௥௫௩௦௣𝑖𝑡 + 
௥ ௥ ௥୞ ୻௠௖௜௘௩௠௫ + ୞ ୻௠ீ௦௬௥௫௩௰ + ୞ ୻௠ெ௥௛௬௪௫௩௰ + ୸𝑖𝑡 - where  ௠=଎ ௠=଎ ௠௫ ௠=଎ ௠௫ 
𝑛୞𝑖௛ௐ ୵௠ ௐ௬௢௬௢௏௠௥௛௬௪௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 are different subsample dummies. Example, Sukuk_Bank = 













Return on Return on Earnings 
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This table presents the coefficients of Sukuk dummies of the test models run across different sukuk issuing county and industry sector respectively in Panel A and Panel B.
Asterisks ***, **, * denote the level of significance at respectively one, five and ten percent levels. The values in the parenthesis show t value. Variance Inflation Factors






         
  
    
  
          
      
     
  
 
      
     
        
 
 
     
 














































































            
            
              





















              
            
                           
                           
                   
                    
         
Table: 6 Analysis on the performance of sukuk issuing firms across different sizes and crisis periods based on the system GMM
estimators 
Panel A: Size group analysis Panel B:  Crisis period analysis
𝑛		 𝑛 ௥ 𝑛		 𝑛்௜௩௝௦௩௤௘௥௚௜𝑖𝑡 = ୴ + ୞ ୵௠ ௐ௬௢௬௢௏௪௠௱௜𝑖𝑡 + ୞ ୮ீ௦௥௫௩௦௣𝑖𝑡 + ୞ ୻௠௖௜௘௩௠௫ + ்௜௩௝௦௩௤௘௥௚௜𝑖𝑡 = ୴ + ୞ ୵௠ ௐ௬௢௬௢௏௚௩௠௪௠௪𝑖𝑡 + ୞ ୮ீ௦௥௫௩௦௣𝑖𝑡 +𝑖௛ௐ		 𝑖௛ௐ ௠=଎ 𝑖௛ௐ		 𝑖௛ௐ 
௥ ௥		 ௥௥ ௥		 𝑛 ୞ ୻௠௖௜௘௩௠௫ + ୞		 ୻௠ீ௦௬௥௫௩௰ + ୞ ୻௠ெ௥௛௬௪௫௩௰ + ୸𝑖𝑡, where  ୞ ୻௠ீ௦௬௥௫௩௰ + ୞ ୻௠ெ௥௛௬௪௫௩௰ + ୸𝑖𝑡 - where  ୞ ୵௠ ௐ௬௢௬௢௏௪௠௱௜𝑖𝑡 are ௠=଎ ௠=଎ ௠=଎௠=଎ ௠=଎		 𝑖௛ௐ ௠௫		 ௠௫௠௫		 ௠௫ 
𝑛different subsample dummies. Example, Sukuk_Large = 1 if the observation is a large­ ୞ ୵௠ ௐ௬௢௬௢௏௚௩௠௪௠௪𝑖𝑡 are different subsample dummies. Example, Sukuk_Crisis = 1𝑖௛ௐ 
sized sukuk issuing firm. if the observation indicates the crisis period performance of all sukuk issuing firms.
Market Value Performance Corporate Financial PerformanceMarket Value Performance Market Value Performance
Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 Model-5 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 Model-5
Variables Variables
Tobin’s Q Price Return on Return on Earnings Tobin’s Q Price Return on Return on Earnings 
earning asset equity per share earning asset equity per share
Sukuk_ Large -1.23** -1.31*** -0.671*** -1.43** -0.437** Sukuk- Crisis -1.345* -3.45** -1.34* -0.567* -0.567** 
(-2.19) (-3.79) (-5.34) (-2.12) (-2.43) (-1.69) (-1.93) (-1.68) (-1.81) (-2.23)
Sukuk_Medium -0.457*** -1.324* -0.078*** -0.679** -0.453*** Sukuk-Non-crisis -0.456** -2.34** -0.567** -0.356** -0.675**
(-2.87) (-1.71) (-3.12) (-2.02) (-3.23) (-2.17) (-2.04) (-1.94) (-2.21) (-2.13)
Sukuk_ Small	 -0.346 -3.31 -0.237** -1.132** -0.123**
(-1.23) (-1.32) (-2.05) (-2.11) (-2.27)
Controls Effect Controls Effect	 YES YES YES YES YESYES YES YES YES YES
Year effect YES YES YES YES YES Year effect	 YES YES YES YES YES
Country effect YES YES YES YES YES Country effect	 YES YES YES YES YES
Industry effect YES YES YES YES YES Industry effect	 YES YES YES YES YES
Constant	 0.435 3.11 0.684* 0.635** -0.134* Constant 0.067 1.45 0.0412 0.561* -0.628*
(0.76) (0.98) (2.02) (2.01) (-1.72) (0.27) (0.10) (1.26) (1.90) (-1.87)
Wald chi-sq.	 134.55 153.98 251.25 390.67 193.5 Wald chi-sq. 211.5 113.9 221.80 116.8 419.76
Observations 2357 2457 2355 2314 2235 Observations 	 2245 2322 2312 2315 2025
The large sukuk issuing firms are those with total asset above the 75th percentile of all sukuk issuing firms and small sukuk issuing firms are those with total asset below 25th percentage, while
the medium sized sukuk issuing firms are those with total assets between 25th and 75th percentiles. The crisis sukuk issuing firms indicate the corporate performance of all sukuk issuing firms
during the financial crisis period 2007–2009, while non- crisis sukuk issuing firms indicate the corporate performance of all sukuk issuing firms during the non-financial crisis period. Asterisks
***, **, * denote the level of significance at respectively one, five and ten percent levels. The values in the parenthesis show t value. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are below the level of






     
   
          
           




     
   
 
    
   
 
   
      
 
  
       
 
 






























































       
      











        
        
      
             
               
         
             
      
 
 
Table: 7 Testing if the weak firms issue sukuk based on IVPROVIT regressions. 
𝑛 𝑛 𝑛்௩௦௙ (ௐ௬௢௬௢𝑖𝑡 = ଎ஜ௕𝑖𝑡) = ୴ + ୵஽்௜௩௝௦௩௤௘௥௚௜𝑖𝑡 + ୞ ୮ீ௦௥௫௩௦௣𝑖𝑡 + ୞ + ୞ ୻𝑖ீ௦௬௥௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 +𝑖௛ௐ 𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖௖௜௘௩𝑖𝑡 𝑖௛ௐ 
𝑛 1st୞ ୻𝑖ெ௥௛௬௪௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 + ୸𝑖𝑡୿ Hଢଯଢ ்௜௩௝௦௩௤௘௥௚௜𝑖𝑡 = ୴ + ୵஽௉ூ௓ூ௏ா௄ூ𝑖𝑡 + ୸𝑖𝑡 and estimated in the stage 𝑖௛ௐ 
regressions. In these regressions, the market value performance is determined by Tobin’s Q and price earnings
ratio, while the corporate financial performance is measured by return on asset, return on equity and earnings
per share. 
Variables
Market Value Performance Corporate Financial Performance





























































Year effect YES YES YES YES
Country effect YES YES YES YES




























Wald chi square 177.06 365.12 142.16 108.71 255.07
Prob > chi square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observation 2237 1784 3233 2738 2172
Asterisks ***, **, * denote the level of significance at respectively one, five and ten percent levels. The values
in the parenthesis show t value. The analysis includes 14 dummy variables for 15 years (Year 2002 to Year
2016) along with other control variables of the model. While testing the 2nd stage regressions, performance
variable is replaced by the estimated values from the 1st stage regression test defined above; results of the 1st 






    
    
 
    
 
 
    
    
 
    

































































                                                           
                                                     
                                                    
    
    
   
    
    





      










     
 
  
                          
                               
                                  
Table: 8 Analysis of Z-scores of sukuk issuing firms based on the system GMM estimators 
Panel A: All sample results
𝑛 𝑛ௗ𝑠ୱ𝑜𝑟௘𝑖𝑡 = ୴ + ୵ௐ௬௢௬௢𝑖𝑡 + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୮ீ௦௥௫௩௦௣௪𝑖𝑡 + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖௖௜௘௩𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑛 𝑛୞𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖ீ௦௬௥௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖ெ௥௛௬௪௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 + ୸𝑖𝑡 
Panel B:  Country-wise analysis
𝑛 𝑛ௗ𝑠ୱ𝑜𝑟௘𝑖𝑡 = ୴ + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୵௠ ௐ௬௢௬௢ୱ𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑡 + 
୞𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖௖௜௘௩𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑛 𝑛୞𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖ெ௥௛௬௪௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖 ீ ௦௬௥௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 + ୸𝑖𝑡 
Panel C: Industry-wise analysis
𝑛 𝑛ௗ𝑠ୱ𝑜𝑟௘𝑖𝑡 = ୴ + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୵௠ ௐ௬௢௬௢𝑖𝑛ௗ𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑡 + 
୞𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖௖௜௘௩𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑛 𝑛୞𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖ீ௦௬௥௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖ெ௥௛௬௪௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 + ୸𝑖𝑡 









Cash flow per share -0.051**
(-2.31)
Profit margin 0.026 ***
(4.94)










Industry effect  Yes
Constant 6.23***
(3.86)
Wald chi square 673.62










































Panel D: Size-wise analysis
𝑛 𝑛ௗ ௪௚௦௩௜𝑖𝑡 = ୴ + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୵௠ ௐ௬௢௬௢𝑠𝑖𝑧௘𝑖𝑡 + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖௖௜௘௩𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑛 𝑛୞𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖ீ௦௬௥௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖ெ௥௛௬௪௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 + ୸𝑖𝑡 
Panel E: Financial crisis analysis
𝑛 𝑛ௗ ௪௚௦௩௜𝑖𝑡 = ୴ + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୵௠ ௐ௬௢௬௢ୱ𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖௖௜௘௩𝑖𝑡 + 
𝑛 𝑛୞𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖ீ௦௬௥௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 + ୞𝑖௛ௐ ୻𝑖ெ௥௛௬௪௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 + ୸𝑖𝑡 












Z score = (௏ௌா + (ூ௨௬௠௫௰஛ா௪௪௜௫௪))஛அ௏ௌா୿ We use natural logarithm of Z-score in the regressions because raw Z-scores are not usually normally distributed (Houston et al. 2010; Mohsni & Otchere, 2018). All
other variables are same in the earlier tables. Asterisks ***, **, * denote the level of significance at respectively one, five and ten percent levels. The values in the parenthesis show t value. Variance Inflation Factors








      
     




     
 
       
       
       
      
         
 
     
      
      
      
        
 
        
        
        
        
           
 
        
        
        
        
          
 
       
       
       
       
         
           
              
                
                
                     





Table: 9 Timing effect analysis 
௒ 𝑛 𝑛TEST A: ்௩௦௙ (ௐ௬௢௬௢𝑖𝑡 = ଎ஜ௕𝑖𝑡) = ୴ + ୞ ୵𝑡 ்௜௩௝௦௩௤௘௥௚௜𝑖𝑡 + ୞ ୮ீ௦௥௫௩௦௣𝑖𝑡 + ୞ ୻𝑖௖௜௘௩𝑖𝑡 +𝑡௛௏ 𝑖௛ௐ 𝑖௛ௐ 
𝑛 𝑛୞ ୻𝑖ீ௦௬௥௫௩௰𝑖𝑡 + ୞ ୻𝑖ெ௥௛௬௪௫௩௰𝑖𝑡𝑖௛ௐ 𝑖௛ௐ + ୸𝑖𝑡୿
𝑛 𝑛TEST B: ்௩௦௙ (ௐ௬௢௬௢𝑖𝑡 = ଎ஜ௕𝑖𝑡) = ୴ + ୵ா௭௜௩௘௞௜ ௧௜௩௝௦௩௤௘௥௚௜𝑖𝑡௛௏ 𝑡𝑜௚௓ + ୞ ୮ீ௦௥௫௩௦௣𝑖𝑡 + ୞ ୻𝑖௖௜௘௩𝑖𝑡 +𝑖௛ௐ 𝑖௛ௐ 







்௩௦௙ (ௐ௬௢௬௢𝑖𝑡 = ଎)




















B Price earning averaget=0 to -4 -.003**
A
Return on assett-0 
Return on assett-1 
Return on assett-2 





B Return on asset averaget=0 to -4 -3.91**
A
Return on equityt-0 
Return on equityt-1 
Return on equityt-2 





B Return on equity averaget=0 to -4 -1.06**
A
Earnings per sharet-0 
Earnings per sharet-1 
Earnings per sharet-2 





B Earnings per share averaget=0 to -4 -0.442**
Asterisks ***, **, * denote the level of significance of the coefficient at respectively one, five and ten percent levels. The 
asterisks are based on the robust t-stats calculated using standard errors clustered by country and year. We report asterisks
(without t-states) only to save space in the table. For regression B, the average performance of the current and preceding
four years (from t0 to t-4) is inputted for the current year (t=0). As an example, the average performance of the period from
2002 to 2006 is taken for 2006. Likewise, the average performance of the period from 2003 to 2007 is taken for 2007. We






   







         
          
        
        
       
        
       
           
       
         
       









    
 
 
          
          
        
        









         
        
       
   
  
   
  
  
         
         





       
          
           




       
       
         
      
  
   
  
             
             




       
        
        
         
         





           
   
 
 
Appendix 1:  Tax legislations & incentives in different countries
Country Descriptions Sources
(1) Sukuk profits are taxed like conventional bond interests. (2) Tax
neutrality is executed following the Income Tax Act 1967. (3) Sukuk
issuers receive tax deduction on expenses incurred for sukuk; enjoy 20%




exemption on foreign currency instruments issued by International Islamic 
Financial Institutions. (4) Foreign sukuk investors get tax exemption on
profits received from ringgit-dominated Islamic securities. (5) Profit paid
on non-ringgit sukuk approved by the SCM is exempt from income tax to
all investors. (6) SPV is exempted from regular tax administrative 
(2012);
ISRA (2015 pp.388­
402); Chang (2009); 
Hegazy (1999).
procedures and is not subject to income tax. (7) Fees up to RM 5000 per
annum for approved IF courses are eligible for personal tax relief. (8) Non­
resident experts in IF verified by Malaysian Islamic Finance Centre
Secretariat receive income tax exemption.
(1) No specific tax law for Islamic finance. (2) No stamp duty. (3) 5% 
Saudi withholding tax is levied on non-residents in respect of profits from
Arabia Islamic securities. (4) GCC nations are exempted from income tax, (5)
Investors are granted a tax credit for 10 years equal to 15% of the paid-up 
capital of shariah approved projects whether in cash or in case of capital 
increase (Capital Incentive).





((1) No corporate income tax. (2) No withholding tax. (3) Provides added Oxford Business
Bahrain benefits for foreign investors, including contracts protecting tenants Group (2018);
against future tax changes; (4) Offers companies with certain exemptions Kern (2015);
from paying import duties. ISRA (2015);
(1) Does not impose federal corporate tax. (2) No withholding duty (3) No
stamp duty. (4) Low customs duties at 4% with necessary exemptions; (5)
UAE	 Dubai (2018);
Kern (2015)
There are no foreign exchange controls, trade quotas or barriers.
(1) Sukuk profits are taxed at the same rates as conventional bonds. (2) Pricewaterhouse-
Imposes tax neutrality policies, (3) No withholding duty. (4) Stamp tax Coopers (2015); Turkey
will no longer be imposed on documents prepared in connection with the Islamibanker
sale of the asset by originator. (2015).
(1) Transections within the Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) are taxed
 
similar to conventional finance alternatives. (2) No stamp duty. (3)
 
Qatar	 Kern (2016); Qatar
Ministry of Foreign
Import tax exemption on heavy duty machinery and raw materials, (4) Affairs (2018)
GCC nations are exempted from tax treatment.
Kuwait	 (1) There is no specific tax laws for Islamic finance. (2) No stamp duty. Kern (2015); Inter­
(3) No personal taxes, not even for expats working in Kuwait. (4) GCC Nations (2018);
countries are exempted from tax. ISRA (2015)
Indonesia 	 (1) Income tax facilities similar to Shari’ah investment incentives under
the income tax concessions. (2) Non-collection of VAT and LST on
importing certain goods. (3) Postponement of import duty on capital goods
and equipment. (4) Non-collection of VAT and LST on the domestic
purchases of certain goods. (5) Indonesian government also offers various




This table provides an overview of tax legislations and tax incentives across different sukuk issuing countries
around the globe.
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